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Competitive Tendering is currently viewed by many as a panacea for the economic 
problems of public transportation services. Competitive tendering is believed to reduce 
costs, increase productivity, decrease subsidies, induce better quality, stimulate 
innovation, and to further the modal share of public transport. The European 
Commission advocates competitive tendering as a means to stimulate competition in 
public transport and as an important additional step towards the goal of an internal 
European market for transportation services.  
The present special issue of European Transport assembles five articles which review 
the experience of those European countries that have the greatest experience with 
competitive tendering so far, namely the UK, Sweden, Norway, and Italy. To these 
European countries the overseas perspective of Australia has been added, because the 
failure of the public tender in Melbourne has received widespread interest among 
experts.  
Basically the papers show that no easy answers and – what is even more important – 
no standard answers emerge. Competitive tendering will not deliver economic gains per 
se. Context and history matter. Moreover, there are some serious inherent pitfalls in 
competitive tendering that have to be avoided. Finally, it is not clear, in how far 
competitive tendering can replace regulation (as contended in Demsetz classical article 
of 1968) or whether there must still be constant monitoring of the winning bidder. It is 
also unclear whether improved regulatory mechansisms could achieve the same 
efficiency results as competitive tendering, but perhaps at less transaction cost.  
Concerning the role of context Boitani/Cambini point out the importance of the 
political framework conditions. The two authors present new original data from which 
they conclude that the Italian experience with the tendering of bus services has been 
disappointing so far. The number of participants in the tendering proceses has been very 
low in most cases and the incumbent won the tender almost everywhere. There has been 
no convergence of cost levels (as should be expected with a well known production 
technology like in bus transport) and the cost savings that have been achieved have been 
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small. The authors conclude that for the devlopment of cost levels past cost levels seem 
to be more decisive rather than competitive tendering.  
The authors emphasize the importance of the “political economy context” for the 
tendering procedure to be successful. Legal and political uncertainties create 
disincentives for potential market entrants to participate. Such uncertainties may arise 
when there is suspicion of favoritism on the part of the tendering authorities, for 
instance, when their own transport enterprises are involved or when tenders seem to be 
tailor-made for the incumbents.  
Regulations are another key element of the political context. In Italy there exist social 
clauses which stipulate that the winner of an auction has to re-employ the staff of the 
former incumbent. Considering that labor costs amount to approximately 2/3 of total 
operating cost this is a very important factor for the efficiency gains that can be 
achieved via a tender.  
Boitani and Cambini believe that public tendering can only be successful when the 
following three preconditions can be met: (1) there must be credible commitment on the 
part of the franchisor to let franchisees go bankrupt, (2) the authorities must be able to 
guarantee fair tenders, possibly by an independent agency, and (3) there must be free 
choice of the factors of production. The authors argue that if these requirements are not 
achievable in the policy process other mechanisms like subsidy capping or yardstick 
competition will be preferable. 
The importance of history and the political context is also apparent from the paper on 
Norwegian bus services tendering by Bekken et al. The authors show that in Norway the 
efficiency gains that have been achieved by competitive tendering are primarily a 
function of previous contractional arrangements. The authors carry out an econometric 
analysis to study the effect of competitive tendering on costs, subsidies, and vehicle 
kilometers. The cost savings amount to approximately 10 %, which is less than in other 
countries, even other Scandinavian countries like Denmark and Sweden. The paper 
explains these low efficiency gains by the fact, that in Norway private involvement has 
already been substantial previous to the opening up of this market to competitive 
tendering. In Norway a great share of bus services has traditionally been provided 
through negotiated net cost contracts with private firms. Public operation was limited to 
major cities. As a result cost savings in Norway were already in the order of 6-20% 
before competitive tendering was introduced. This raises the question, of course, what 
gave the private firms the incentives to achieve these gains, given that they had a de 
facto monopoly position. Bekken et al. attribute this to the fact that these firms were 
operating under the constant threat of competitive tendering. 
Bekken et al. report that the Norwegian counties have preferred to cash in the 
efficiency gains of competitive tendering in the form of reduced subsidies rather than in 
the form of increased service quality, apparently without great loss in patronage. A 
further interesting result achieved in the paper is that counties with a mixed regime 
(partly tendering, partly negotiated contracts) have fared less well in terms of cost 
reduction and output than counties which exclusively have kept to negotiated contracts 
or exclusively moved to competitive tendering. The authors conjecture that this can be 
explained by the fact that the threat of competitive tendering breaks the trust 
relationship established with the operating firm and the purchaser. As the prolongation 
of the existing contract becomes less likely firm behave more according to the actual 
length of the contract. The horizon of investments will be shortened and risk aversion 
increases.  
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The paper by Stanley fits rather well to the main result by Bekken et al. In Melbourne 
too, large efficiency gains had been achieved before the city decided to put out its public 
rail services to tender. As a result it could have been predicted by the bidders and the 
franchisors alike that the potential for further gains was low. The opposite occurred 
however and rather optimistic bids were made and accepted by the authorities.  
In August 1999 Melbourne split its rail services into four parts, two heavy and two 
light rail (tram) operations which were to be put out to tender. (There was also one 
regional passenger service which was tendered too) The idea behind this construction 
was to allow yard-stick competition between different transportation firms. National 
Express Group (NEX), the British Bus Operator, won the franchise to operate one of the 
two metropolitan train services and one of the two metropolitan tram services. The other 
metropolitan train service was awarded to Connex and the other tram service to Yarra 
Trams. The contract length was set at 12 years for the tram services and at 15 years for 
the train services. Already in early 2002, after only three years of operation, all 
franchisees reported financial problems. The government responded with substantial 
short term funding. Nevertheless, a few months later National Express stopped 
operations. After interim arrangements with the two remaining companies in the market 
Connex finally took over the whole train network and Yarra Trams the entire tram 
network in 2004. The contract lengths were shortened from 15 to 5 years.  
Stanley attributes the failure of the Melbourne tender to several factors. Among these 
are overoptimism of the bidders, as mentioned above. The bidders were influenced in 
their expectations by the substantial growth rates in the British transport sector and did 
not realize that in Melbourne further cost cutting would be difficult. But Stanley also 
mentions other problems like the poor performance of the existing ticketing system and 
unsatisfactory security around rail stations. Stanley conjectures, however, that these 
factors are only part of the explanation. In his view the real causes lie deeper and point 
to a major problem in competitive tendering in general. Invoking ideas from the so 
called Capture Theory of the Positive Theory of Economic Regulation Stanley claims 
that the bidders were quite conscious of the fact that their bids were unrealistic. Their 
market entry was aimed at “getting a foot in the door” and “creating facts” for the 
regulatory authorities who would find it politically difficult to let the bidders go 
bankrupt. Instead of incurring the political troubles connected with service disruptions 
the authorities would rather grant fare increases to the troubled companies. This 
hypothesis raises the objection, of course, why reputation effects do not counteract such 
strategic behaviour. Moreover, as Stanley himself recognizes, competent regulators 
should immediately recognize unrealistic bids and see through the strategic intentions of 
the bidders.1 Stanley claims, however, that in the Melbourne case due to a mixture of 
ignorance and ideological preconception the responsible decision-makers were not able 
to assess the bids in a realistic fashion. He concludes his paper by spelling out key-
elements of what he terms a “trusting partnership” between the State and private 
operators in transport service planning and delivery.  
The two remaining papers in this special issue of European Transport deal with 
Sweden and Great Britain, respectively, the two countries that have certainly 
accumulated the greatest experience in competition in public transport services so far.  
Alexandersson and Hulten give an overview over the experience in the UK, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Sweden. Their focus is on railway services. Since the 
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Transport Policy Act in 1988 the Swedish railway sector has a vertically separated 
structure, where investments and maintenance of railway infrastructure are the 
responsibility of Banverket, a public enterprise. At the level of train operation the 
former state railway operator SJ competes with new entrants, like Connex, Citypendeln 
and Tagkompaniet. The County Public Transport Authorities (CPTAs) act as 
responsible agencies for regional services and are compensated by the state for deficit 
making services.  
New entry was slow in Sweden at first. From 1989 to 1995 there was only one single 
competitor to SJ, BK Tag. The break-through did not occur before 2000. Alexandersson 
and Hulten attribute the break-through to the increased transparency that had gradually 
improved after more and more functions like allocation of track access rights (slots) and 
train traffic control had been moved from SJ to Banverket, the network operator. This 
created safety for investors and new entrants, like Connex, Citypendeln and 
Tagkompaniet which are now strong competitors of SJ.  
Alexandersson and Hulten report that competitive tendering of railway services in 
Sweden has led to subsidy reductions in the order of 20% in the first round and an 
additional 28% in the second round of tendering by CPTAs. There has also been an 
increase of 32% in patronage - on short distances even of 70%! This means stronger 
growth than for all other modes and can probably not be attributed to tendering alone. 
Alexandersson and Hulten mention better integration with bus-services by the CPTAs 
as a major success factor. 
Compared to these successes of public tendering in Sweden there are some negative 
aspects too. The average number of bidders has been rather low. It amounted to 1-2 
bidders for net cost contracts (which are mainly used for the regional services tendered 
by the CPTAs) and 2-3 bidders for gross cost contracts (which are mainly used for 
interregional services tendered by the state). There were also several cases of non-
fulfilment of contracts due to too optimistic bids, the best known case being the 
problems with Stockholm’s commuter services in 2000. 
Great Britain has certainly been the country that has gained the most publicity for its 
far reaching experiments with competition in public transport. Concerning the railways 
most observers agree that after some initial reductions in the subsidies to the TOCS, 
subsidies now are almost back to the initial level before the reform. Alexandersson and 
Hulten even speak of a “cost explosion” in Great Britain’s railroad sector, not only with 
respect to train operations (the level of the TOCS) but also with respect to infrastructure 
and rolling stock. Many of the TOCS seem to be in serious financial trouble. The big 
success of the British rail reform undoubtedly lies in the substantial increase in 
patronage that has occurred.  
Britain has employed both competition in the market (open access) and competition 
for the market. Indeed this distinction was coined in Great Britain already in the middle 
of the 19th century by Chadwick, long before 1968 when Demsetz published his classic 
article “Why Regulate Utilities?” on which the modern philosophy of public tendering 
is based. (It is very little known, by the way, that the concept of competition for the 
market was developed even earlier than Chadwick by the German railway politician 
Hansemann in 1831) The paper by White contends that the intensity of competition is 
stronger in tendered services than in services which are characterized by “on the road or 
on the track” competition” White attributes this to the many potential alternative 
providers which are waiting in the wings to replace an unsatisfactory incumbent. With 
the large experience gained in the tendering of bus and rail services in Britain there is a 
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large supply of potential and knowledgeable market entrants with ensuing competitive 
pressure on incumbents. In contrast, it may be far more difficult to replace an incumbent 
by “on the road-competition” who may have developed a monopoly position over long 
years of operation.  
In his general conclusions White also casts an aside on the Melbourne case mentioned 
above. White conjectures that the failure may be due to an inherent deficiency of using 
net cost contracts. In his view net cost contracts run the danger of doubling the “winners 
curse” problem of auctions. This is because overoptimism can not only occur with 
respect to costs but with respect to revenues too. It may therefore be advisable to use 
gross cost contracts rather than net cost contracts. As British examples he cites the two 
Virgin rail franchises which too were based on very optimistic forecasts of large 
ridership and revenue growth. He admits, hower, that in growing markets, the effect of 
doubling the winners’ curse may be less important. In growing markets bidders may be 
able to spread the risk over larger networks rather than single routes. But even in this 
case there may be a point for gross contracts. Gross contracts may help to increase the 
number of bidders because there is less risk to be taken by the bidders. Thus more small 
enterprises may be encouraged to participate in the tender. White also shows that price 
competition in long distance markets has been more effective than in local markets. 
In conclusion it seems safe to say that uncritical optimism with respect to tendering of 
public transport services has given way to a more realistic assessment. It has become 
clear that “one size fits all” solutions are no longer appropriate. Success or failure in this 
area depend very much on history and on political circumstances which require careful 
and thorough ex ante analysis. The role of experience and learning by both authorities 
and bidders can hardly be underestimated. In addition, many theoretical issues still seem 
to be underresearched. This applies in particular to the strategic aspects of the bidding 
process and concerns perhaps more the institutional and political economy aspects of 
the matter than, for example, deficits in pure auction theory (see also Kain, 2006).  
On the empirical side I can possibly do no better than to cite the last sentences in the 
Alexandersson/Hulten paper: 
“We see at least two major possibilities for future empirical research. Firstly, a 
comparative European study directed towards measuring the effects of competitive 
tendering and testing the relative contribution of different factors, such as network size, 
number of bidders, contract length, how many times the services have been tendered, 
type of contract (net or gross cost), upstream competitive markets or vertical monopoly, 
and so on. Secondly, research projects including both statistical and qualitative data, 
comparing railway systems using competitive tendering to railway systems using either 
negotiated contracts or a monopoly regime. Such a study could shed some light on the 
relative merits of the different regimes after nearly two decades of experimentation with 
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